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Summary This paper tries to examine theoretical and empirical literature
on the existence of a relationship between trade policies and
economic growth. Two transitional economies, Belarus and
Lithuania, have been chosen as a basis for the analysis of the
effects of the respective trade policies on economic growth. Both
economies are small, but their trade policies and rates of
economic growth differ. Lithuania enjoys free trade, while
Belarus' trade policy is characterized by strong government
interference. Rates of economic growth have recently mostly
been positive in both economies, but Belarussian have proven
stronger than Lithuanian. Nevertheless, neither the policies that
helped reach high rates of economic growth in Belarus nor the
environment in which they thrived seem to be stable. Thus,
should the external conditions change, Belarus impressive
growth will likely prove to be unsustainable in the future.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Do countries that liberalize trade more also grow faster? This
question has been one of the focal points for many researchers who started to
construct indices of openness to establish such a connection. On the theoretical
ground, we are faced with two major growth models. Both the neoclassical and the
endogenous growth model assume a causal relationship between trade and growth
and agree that the principal contributions to growth come from technological
progress and the accumulation of physical and human capital. What the models
disagree on, is the temporal effect of trade liberalization on the economic growth.
The neoclassical model suggests that trade liberalization will increase the rate of
growth only temporarily, whereas the endogenous model suggests that the increase
may be permanent.
The bulk of empirical evidence points to the existence of a
positive relationship between trade and growth. In most empirical studies, measures
of trade liberalization are added to the statistical analysis of cross-country growth. In
this paper we would like to give an overview of various measures of openness and
discuss the obvious controversy of results. Countries that by one measure may be
considered 'open' are 'closed' when another measure is taken into account. The
differences in results can be explained by different approaches to the definition of
openness and to the methodological apparatus.
Evidence for developed and emerging economies cannot be
sought in the same way. What makes the proving of the connection difficult in the
case of emerging economies is: a. data series are too short and b. it is hard to
distinguish the effects of trade liberalization from the effects of any other policies
that were part of the economic reforms. We have chosen Lithuania and Belarus for
the analysis of effects of trade policies on economic growth because their economic
and institutional conditions, as well as structure were similar at the beginning of the
transition process. Both countries were states in the USSR and their trade occurred
within the borders of the Union under the management of the Central Government.
After the USSR broke down, both Lithuania and Belarus were faced with a collapse
of trade and had to make decisions about the future of their trade policies. Our
paper shows that the paths they have chosen were quite different, and examines their
effects on economic growth.
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2
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Small differences in the rates of economic growth, maintained for
extended periods of time, can lead to dramatic differences in living standards. To
examine the primary issues raised by the economic growth theories, we have to pay
particular attention to the differences between the neoclassical growth model and
recent alternatives to that model grouped as the "endogenous growth theory".
A great deal of modern theoretical and empirical work on
economic growth is based on the neoclassical growth model of Robert Solow (1956)
and Trevor Swan (1956) (Mervar, 1996). This model recognizes that substitution
between labor and capital takes place in response to changes in their relative prices.
There are some additional assumptions:
. The economy operates under constant returns to scale;
. There are diminishing returns on both labor and capital;
. The labor force is growing at a constant rate. The labor force
growth rate, the ratio of savings to the national income and the
depreciation rate are "exogenous" in the basic neoclassical model;
. Technological improvements take place at a constant rate. The
rate of technological progress is also exogenous.
One of the most important assumptions of the neoclassical
model is that of a convergence in per capita incomes. Other things being equal,
low-income countries should grow more rapidly than high-income countries. Since
low-income countries start out with less capital per worker than high-income
countries, their rate of return on capital is higher, the incentive for capital
accumulation is thus greater, and income growth is faster.
There have been a variety of criticisms of the neoclassical model.
One is that in the real world "good" government policies, such as trade liberalization,
policies to promote domestic savings, and the removal of distortions in the domestic
marketplace, ought to permanently increase the rate of economic growth, while in
the neoclassical model such policies only temporarily increase the growth rate. The
alternative theoretical contribution to the neoclassical theory has been proposed
under the name of 'endogenous growth theory'.
The endogenous growth theory suggests that positive shifts in the
national savings ratio, or in the static level of technological efficiency, can cause the
growth rate of the economy to be permanently higher. If these models are correct,
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even the trade liberalization which induces only static gains in the economic
efficiency may in fact lead to a permanent increase in the rate of economic growth,
since all static efficiency effects lead to dynamic growth effects in these models.
Both models provide complementary insights into potential
linkages between trade liberalization and growth, with the neoclassical model
emphasizing increases in the economic efficiency that arise out of liberalization
while endogenous growth models admit the possibility that trade liberalization
might increase the rate of technical innovation. The principal difference between the
two models is that trade liberalization increases the growth rate in the neoclassical
model only temporarily, during the transitional period, while in the endogenous
growth model this effect may be permanent. Neoclassical and endogenous growth
models are in broad agreement that the accumulation of physical and human
capital, and technological progress are the principal causes of economic growth
(USITC, 1997).
More recently, Romer (1990) has launched a new model - by
adding an explanation of the technical progress based on increasing returns, research
and development and imperfect competition, human capital and government
policies. Romer argues that the economy with a larger stock of human capital will
experience faster growth, which can be speeded up further by free international trade.
Olson (1996) also sheds new light on the models of growth by
emphasizing the importance of the rule of law and argues that many countries are
poor because they do not make good use of their resources i.e. resources are wasted
in many cases. The waste of resources is the greatest where the institutional bases of
property rights and rule of law are least developed. Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) draw
several conclusions from the latest studies based on Olson's model of growth that
explain the differences in growth patterns across transition countries. First they find
that initial conditions do matter in explaining differences in growth patterns. Most
studies find that per capita growth is inversely related to the initial level of output,
i.e. that poor countries generally grow faster. The availability of resources does not
necessarily guarantee growth, while unfavorable geographic circumstances may
hinder it. Lastly, economic policies have a strong impact on growth, as does legal,
political, and institutional framework.
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These measures are average tariffs, percentage of imports covered by non-tariff barriers, index1
of structure-adjusted trade intensity, Edward Leamer's measures of openness and trade
distortion, and Dollar's measure of price distortion.
3
MORE LIBERALIZATION, MORE GROWTH
- BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?
The empirical research in this area focuses mainly on factors that
generally influence both trade and growth. Typically, crucial factors that increase the
output and are thus related to supply are investment, productivity growth,
technological change and human capital accumulation. The demand side drive is
related to the growth of income - which has been above the growth of trade in the
last half century.
Early attempts at establishing the link between trade policy and
growth in a multi-country investigation in developing countries in 1970s used the
effective rates of protection to argue that highly protectionist policies of the time
hampered economic growth by suppressing savings, causing large-scale labor
unemployment and underutilization of capacity. In subsequent studies researchers
tried to use the effective exchange rate as a criterion for classifying trade policies as
'import substituting', 'neutral' or 'export promoting', depending on whether the rate
paid by importers was different from the rate paid by exporters.
In empirical research many measures of openness have been
constructed in order to (dis)prove the existence of the linkage between trade and
growth. The difficulty in their use is that they have contradictory results of openness.
The most trivial measures of openness are the ratios of exports to GDP, imports to
GDP and exports plus imports to GDP. Their drawback is that they tend to be large
for small countries and small for large countries, regardless of their trade policy.
Pritchett (1996) examines several relevant measures of openness1
and finds two with statistically significant correlation at the 5 percent level among
openness measures in the expected direction and five cases where correlation was
perverse, in the sense that a country was open by one measure and closed by another.
He finds the average tariff a useful indicator of a country's trade policy stance, also
positively correlated with the non-tariff barriers (NTB) coverage ratio. Pritchett's
findings are further supported by Lee and Swagel (1997) and leads to the conclusion
that high-tariff countries are likely to have high NTBs as well (USITC, 1997).
Sachs and Warner (1995) captured positive impacts of the
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When conditions of an equal number of goods and factors, identical technologies and absence2
of transportation costs hold, free trade in goods leads to the equalization of factor prices.
openness on economic growth by using a dummy variable to differentiate 'closed'
and 'open' economies and find that annual per capita GDP growth in open
economies exceeded that in closed economies by 2.2 to 2.5 percent (USITC, 1997).
Harrison (1996) reviewed over 20 previous studies that attempted
to make a connection between openness and growth. Her conclusion was that,
regardless of differences in the methods of research, most of them point to a positive
impact of liberalization on growth and productivity.
Frankel and Romer (1996) point out that the policies that are
usually implemented together with trade liberalization, i.e. free market, stable fiscal
and monetary policies, make it harder to prove the relationship between trade and
growth. They use the gravity model of trade to argue that part of the trade explained
by distance is not correlated with countries' policy decisions and conclude that
countries that trade more have higher per capita income.
Edwards (1998) analyzes robustness of the openness-growth
relationship to the use of different existing indicators, and again, confirms that his
results suggest there is indeed a significantly positive relationship between openness
and productivity growth.
Ben-David (1993) grounds his analysis of the effects of trade
liberalization on income convergence on the factor price equalization theorem . His2
finds that a. the observed convergence of the European countries was not simply a
continuation of a long-term convergence trend unrelated to postwar economic
integration, b. the countries that chose not to enter a free-trade agreement did not
experience the same levels of convergence as the European Economic Community,
and c. other subsets of economies in the world which were not economically
integrated did not experience convergence.
 Finally, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) seek an answer to the
question 'Do countries with lower policy-induced barriers to international trade grow
faster, once relevant country characteristics are controlled for?' by reviewing papers
of Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), and
Frankel and Romer (1999). Their main finding is that there is little evidence
confirming that trade policies which employ lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers are
correlated with higher economic growth. Rodríguez and Rodrik detect
methodological problems in the papers that they examine, which, they argue, mostly
stem from the fact that the indicators of openness used by researchers are either poor
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measures of trade barriers or are highly correlated with other sources of bad
economic performance. In their concluding remarks, Rodríguez and Rodrik point
out that they do not try to negate the relationship between trade and growth, but are
skeptical as to whether the relationship is as strong as many researchers claim it is.
They assert that simple trade weighted tariff and non-tariff coverage ratios are better
indicators of openness than any of the indices of openness. Rodríguez and Rodrik
finish their paper by arguing that integration into the world economy cannot
effectively substitute a development strategy, which includes institutional reforms.
4
BELARUS AND LITHUANIA - WHICH IS
THE WAY TO GROWTH?
a. Initial Conditions - Back in the USSR
The Belarussian economy was an integral part of the Soviet
economic system for more than 70 years, and the Lithuanian for nearly 50 years. The
states of the Union owned land, institutions and almost all property, including
enterprises. The production and services sectors were managed by the Central
Government. The government and leadership of the Soviet Communist Party acted
as administrators of one large multi-sector enterprise. For decades, a tightly
centralized management had been able to provide intensive economic growth. In
Belarus alone, over a period of 70 years production had grown more than 100 times,
thereby making a formerly agrarian country a powerful and wealthy economy. A
similar transformation occurred in Lithuania, turning its economic structure from
a predominantly agrarian into industrial. However, production volumes and
economic structures of both economies met predominantly the needs of the Union
and to a lesser extend the needs of its domestic economies, and thus their true
comparative advantages were neglected. The situation altered once the centralized
management began to lose effectiveness in running the economies that were
becoming more complex.
At the start of the transition process, Belarus and Lithuania had
high human capital index and were the most prosperous among the states of the
FSU according to economic and social indicators (Annex 1). Belarus' GDP per capita
was 17 percent higher than the average in the USSR at the time, while Lithuania' was
10 percent higher than the average.
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b. The Industries, the Origin of Imports
 and Their Nature
Lithuania
The economic structure of Lithuania was heavily industrialized,
with the market dominated by large-scale enterprises with a high number of
employees. Lithuania managed only 10 percent of its industrial capacity, while the
rest of the economic activity was centrally managed from Moscow. The industry was
to a large extent dependent on raw materials imported from the Soviet Union and
on the Unions' demand for its exports.
Lithuania's natural resources can be described as poor:
agricultural land and forests, together with supplies of peat and building materials
and scarce deposits of gas and oil. The Lithuanian output concentrated mainly on
machinery and machine parts, food processing, construction materials, chemicals,
electronics and light industry (textiles, apparel, household appliances and furniture).
The energy generation sector was very important, in particular the oil refining but
also a nuclear power plant and hydro-electrical as well as oil- and gas-fired power
plants. In addition, the agriculture dominated Lithuania's output structure (27%),
more than in other Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. Again, the output
structure was designed to meet the demand of the Union, making its industries
uncompetitive in the world market.
Belarus
All the markets and sources of raw materials in Belarus, as in
Lithuania, were located predominately in the FSU but outside the country. Deep
economic integration at the all-Union level created internal imbalances in the output
structure and hampered the development of links among domestic industries.
Belarus played the role of the Union's assembly line, at one point
being an area for the most scientifically advanced industries and a major supplier of
agricultural products - milk, meat, potatoes and flax. Economic specialization in
Belarus was shaped by a multitude of natural, technological, economic and
demographic factors. A relatively scant supply of mineral resources hindered the
development of mining and primary processing industries. The country's favorable
geographical position, its developed transportation infrastructure, inclusion in the
Common Power Supply System and highly-educated and economically active
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population facilitated the development of advanced machine-building, instrument
making, chemical, petrochemical, electronic, radio-electronic and manufacturing
industries.
c. Intrastate Trade and Its Collapse
Both Lithuania and Belarus depended strongly on intra-FSU
trade, while trade with the rest of the world was negligible. The Lithuanian and
Belarussian share of intra-FSU trade as percentage of GDP was 34 percent and 45
percent respectively in 1989. Both countries imported the bulk of their raw materials,
components and energy from the Soviet Union and exported most of their output
back to the Soviet Union. Thus, their economies faced a severe deprivation of the
most essential components that they needed to function independently when the
Soviet system collapsed.
Common features faced by the enterprises in early 1990s included
a problematic heritage of the planned economy system, lack of private sector,
obsolete technology, dependence on FSU market and supplies and non-market
oriented products. There were several reasons for the decline in intra-FSU trade
during early years of the transition. Probably the most important among them was
the collapse of the payments system. As the two countries initiated broader
market-oriented reforms, different trade regimes which are in place today started to
emerge. The transition had several dimensions. Firstly, real appreciation of the
currencies occurred over certain periods and at various times in different countries,
giving rise to pressure for protection through more traditional means, for example,
through the introduction of differentiated tariff schedules. Secondly, export controls
on raw materials and energy were gradually removed. Finally, the state trade
agreements which aimed at stabilizing trade among the CIS countries were
progressively abandoned.
d. The Transition and Changes in Trade Policies
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, economic
difficulties in each of the newly independent states became more acute. The
authorities in many states recognized that far-reaching structural changes were
needed to establish the framework for a market-oriented economy. In moving
successfully to a market-based system, comprehensive deregulation of prices was
essential to guide the efficient allocation of resources. For the energy-importing
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economies, this meant confronting large terms of trade shock, which would imply
a substantial and permanent reduction in real income as energy prices rose markedly
towards the international market level.
Lithuania
The government of Lithuania planned to achieve a radical
structural change in ownership and a rearrangement of the institutional structure.
Priority was given to the adjustment of the legal framework for functioning of a
market economy, liberalization of prices, privatization of enterprises and
liberalization of trade and external sector. In the face of high inflation and quite
politicized monetary policy, the currency board was introduced in 1994, and the litas
was pegged to the U.S dollar at the rate 4 to 1. The currency board has brought both
advantages and disadvantages: it has encouraged sound fiscal discipline and brought
down inflation while, on other hand, negatively affecting Lithuania' export
competitiveness. Although the currency board arrangement is set to remain in force,
a switch in the peg is from the US dollar to the Euro in 2002 has been announced
to reflect changes in the trade orientation.
Prices in Lithuania were liberalized in 1991, leaving only 15
percent of prices still controlled in 1992; mainly housing, energy,
telecommunications and public transportation prices. As a result of privatization,
carried out in two phases, in 2000 the private sector accounted for about 70 percent
of GDP (Table 2).
Lithuanian foreign trade policy is mainly based on liberal
economic principles thanks to trade policy reforms that were introduced gradually.
The reforms followed three major principles: a) to maintain an open trade regime;
b) to obtain access to the European markets through regional agreements; and, c) to
assume obligations of the multilateral trading system (WTO). Lithuania became a
member of the WTO in 2001 and by that year all export duties and restrictions were
completely abolished.. The foreign trade policy's main regulative tool are import
duties- the average import tariff is 5.3 percent (Table 1). For a period of time, export
tariffs were levied on a few raw materials to protect the economy from their outflow.
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Table 1
COMPARISON OF TARIFF RATES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Tariff Rate (unweighted in %)
Country Year All Goods Agriculture Manufactures
Belarus 1998 12.6 11.0 13.3
Bulgaria 1998 17.6 26.8 15.3
Czech Rep. 1999  6.8 12.3  5.4
Hungary 1999 12.4 32.2  7.4
Kazakhstan 1996  9.4  9.9  9.2
Latvia 1998  5.8 14.0  2.5
Lithuania 1997  4.6  9.1  2.7
Moldova 1996  6.7 11.2  4.9
Poland 1999 15.9 32.8 10.9
Romania 1999 13.1 23.6 10.7
Russian Fed. 1997 12.6 10.9 13.4
Slovak Rep. 1999  6.4 12.4  4.6
Slovenia 1996 10.6 13.8  9.9
Ukraine 1998 10.0 15.7  7.5
Source: The World Bank website.
Before transition, Lithuanian products had poor access to the
markets outside the FSU or CMEA. Therefore, another important step toward
improving market access conditions was the signing of a free-trade agreement (FTA)
with the EU in 1994. It called for a six-year transition period during which trade
barriers should have been removed. The agreement grants Lithuania the EU tariff
exemptions on industrial goods, textiles, and agricultural products. Under the
provisions of the FTA, zero rate duties are applied to mainly industrial goods. In
2000, trade turnover with countries falling under the free trade regime amounted to
67 percent of Lithuania's total foreign trade turnover. The FTA with the EU was
beneficial for Lithuania because it forced the country to restructure its economy to
meet higher production standards and enhance its competitiveness. It also gave it
easier access to hard currency markets and enabled the much-needed redirection of
trade flows from the FSU market to the EU. Trade flows between Lithuania and the
EU have increased gradually, and Lithuania has imported capital goods (12-16
percent of total imports on average), needed to revitalize the economy, under
favorable conditions. Opening its trade regime and obtaining improved market
access through preferential regime with Western partners was crucial and now, the
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majority of industries are big exporters. For example, the textile industry exports
about 91 percent of its output, and wood and pulp industry, the electronics industry,
and the oil industry export above 70 percent. Along with the EU countries,
Lithuania has signed free trade agreements with EFTA countries, CEFTA countries,
the Baltic countries, Turkey and Ukraine. Trade turnover with countries falling
under the most favored nation (MFN) regime constitutes 29 percent of Lithuania's
total foreign trade turnover.
Protection of the agricultural products is still a sensitive issue for
the country and that is why the import tariff for agricultural goods has been raised
several times. In 1999, it was almost six times higher than the tariff applied to
industrial products. The agricultural lobby is rather influential due to the fact that
a large portion of the population is still active in the agriculture, and also helped by
social connotations of the sector. Under the shield of tariffs and in the absence of
foreign competition, the agricultural sector has yet not been restructured.
Belarus
Belarus' transition to a market economy has been slow, mostly
due to the inconsistency in carrying out reforms. In Belarus the state controls
significant elements of the export sector, because of the overall lack of progress in
privatization. The state trading activities are the main remaining instrument of
export regulation. This is due to the fact that a substantial portion of quasi-fiscal
activities is carried out outside the budget, including directed lending by the banking
system to the priority sectors, notably agriculture. Belarus also made attempts at
propping up its industries by using a soft budget and import restrictions. But the
result was disappointing because the old industries' output levels declined despite the
efforts to achieve the opposite. At the same time, a new profitable sector output
failed to deliver partly because it faced higher tax and regulatory burdens, put in
place to help the old industries. As a result of a dominant role of the government
in the economy, private sector activity is still the lowest among transition economies,
amounting to only 20 percent of GDP at the end of 2000 (EBRD, 2001).
Little privatization has taken place, the enterprise restructuring
has been slow and investment levels are declining. The agricultural sector remains
largely unreformed, and is a major drain on the financial resources of the country,
absorbing about one fourth of the total lending by banks as of mid-2001 (or about
3 percent of GDP).
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Belarus has a relatively specialized economy that depends heavily
on foreign trade (in 2000, exports are estimated to have reach 70 percent of GDP
and imports 80 percent, see Annex 2). The principal imports are grains, oil and gas
as well as consumer products, while the main exports are manufacturing goods,
especially household products and transport vehicles. Despite the importance of
foreign trade, the state maintains extensive restrictions on foreign trade and
exchange, although a number of important liberalizing measures were undertaken
in late 1999 and 2000.
The import tariff is in line with the international practice (Table
1). Tariffs range from 0 percent to 30 percent for most goods and the weighted
average import tariff is 10.5 percent. Efforts to strengthen preferential arrangements
continued, however, through the establishment of a customs union among Belarus,
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Russia in 1996. Tajikistan joined the Union
in 1999. The tariff schedules for Belarus are very close to the Russian tariff schedule
because of the proposed customs union among these countries. Russia's import
weighted applied tariff rates average 13.6 percent. However, Belarus imposes
quantitative export restrictions on a number of products such as fertilizers, scrap
metal, copper and aluminum. There are also minimum prices on exports of meat,
dairy and a number of other products. This measure reflects partly the price controls
in the domestic market, with the intention to prevent the export of subsidized basic
consumer goods. However, these minimum export prices create an indirect export
tax on relatively more efficient producers and provides incentives for smuggling.
 Belarus has also used foreign exchange controls to limit imports
in the context of balance-of-payments problems. However, very serious non-market
barriers to trade of a different kind exist in Belarus. These relate to the general
weaknesses of market supporting institutions, which appear to be pervasive but
difficult to document and quantify systematically.
d. Economic Growth
This section estimates the impact of economic reforms on the
general economic situation, relying mainly on analyses of the changes in GDP and
other macroeconomic variables. Bearing in mind that trade liberalization has taken
place at the same time as other policies that were part of the reforms, we found it
difficult to abstract the impact of the trade policy on growth directly.
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Table 3
GDP STRUCTURE IN 1990 AND 1999
Belarus Lithuania
1990 1999 1990 1999
Industry 37.9 27.6 31.7 20.1
Agriculture 22.7 12.2 27.5  7.9
Construction  7.7  5.8 10.4  6.6
Transportation  6.4 11.4  5.9  9.5
Other 25.3 43 24.5 55.9
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2001.
GDP structure was similar in both Lithuania and Belarus with
the industry and agriculture dominating the structure, while the services sector
remained less developed (Table 3). The share of industry and agriculture in the GDP
structure declined in both economies, while the share of services almost doubled.
The GDP structure was becoming more similar to those in the developed market
economies. In early 1990s, the major challenge faced by these two small economies
which depended highly on trade was to restructure the economy as a whole and
create a favorable environment for exporters: stable macroeconomic conditions,
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Lithuania
Lithuanian GDP decreased substantially (to about 40 percent of
its 1990 level) between 1990 and 1994. Two major factors that influenced such a
dramatic GDP fall can be identified as follows:
. Demand shock: A sharp fall in demand from FSU countries
influenced export performance.
. Supply shock: Russia introduced price liberalization in 1992 and
substantially increased export prices of oil and raw materials.
Previously, Lithuania benefited from Russian energy and raw
materials that were below market prices.
Lithuania's production performance was also harmed by the
prevalence of exceedingly large industrial enterprises, whose output was not in line
with the country's competitive advantages. A contraction of the export market and
a rise in input prices brought about a decline of both the industry and agriculture,
which in the pre-transitional period contributed most to the output. A prudent fiscal
policy and pursuance of the currency board arrangement helped improve the
unfavorable macroeconomic situation - the inflation rate was slashed down from
1163 percent in 1992 to 1.3 percent (end of period) in 2000.
Following a few years of recession, the output began to recover
in 1995 at a rate of 3.3 percent (Figure 1) but was hit again in 1999 as a result of the
Russian crisis (-4.2 percent) - thus testifying to the economy's great exposure to
external shocks. The significance of trade in explaining changes in growth in the
small Lithuanian market is visible in the decline of exports to Russia from 16.5
percent of total exports in 1998 to 7 percent in 1999, making GDP growth in 1999
negative. In 2000, Lithuania regained a positive growth rate again which was mainly
driven by the export growth. The following year's economic growth exceeded
expectations and, coming in at 5.9 percent, it was one of the highest in the whole
CEE while trade 'openness' reached 97.4 percent of GDP in 2000 and was higher
than in 1999. This increase in trade openness indicates that the recovery of 2000 was
export-driven. Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) claim that these strong rates of export
growth in the CEE and the Baltic countries tended to be considerably higher than
in other transition economies, suggesting that in addition to tight macroeconomic
policies and structural reforms fostering competitiveness, foreign trade liberalization
also contributed to rapid export growth. The growth of enterprises financed with
foreign capital was significant too. This investment has proved to be an indirect
trade factor contributing to the Lithuanian growth and will be discussed later on.
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Most significantly, a change in the foreign trade geography and
the structure of goods and services in exports and imports occurred (Table 4). Trade
reorientation for Lithuania was a necessary action due to its dependence on trade
and the collapse of the FSU market. It should be noted that a reorientation of trade
flows towards Europe also brought along overcoming of the technological and
quality gaps, thus implying that the economy has restructured. Havrylyshyn et al.
(1999) confirm that an observable diversification towards new markets, advanced
economies in particular, together with a greater emphasis on exports of new products
with a specialization on the fine level of product detail, could provide an early
reflection of structural changes. Additionally, the reorientation will ensure higher
stability of trade flows and decrease exposure to the shocks of single big markets
such as the Russian market. Nevertheless, the CIS countries and especially Russia will
most likely continue to be important markets for Lithuanian producers, as well as
an important source of energy and raw materials. As regards the structure of the
domestic production - traditional industries remained alive but less significant while
a share of some new industries in the domestic product more than doubled,
signifying their potential and importance for the country (Table 3) with mineral
products, fertilizers, textile and textile articles being the most competitive export
products.
Table 4
LITHUANIA'S TRADING PARTNERS IN 1990 AND 2000
(PERCENT DISTRIBUTION)
Exports Imports
1994 2000 1994 2000
Industrial countries 32.1 55.9 36.5 50.0
of which EU 30.1 47.9 32.3 43.3
Developing countries 67.9 44.0 63.5 48.5
Europe 65.2 42.5 62.5 43.6
of which CEEC 18.2 24.3 12.0 11.1
Russia 28.2  7.1 39.3 27.4
Africa  1.1  0.1  0.2  0.3
Asia  1.2  0.7  0.4  3.4
Middle East  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2
Western Hemisphere  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.9
Other countries  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Source: IMF Trade Direction 2001.
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The downside of the trade liberalization are the steadily
increasing import volumes that force Lithuania to maintain high levels of trade
deficit.
Belarus
The output records in Belarus present a challenge to the standard
transition paradigm (Annex 4). It had low output declines in the initial years of
transition and, like Lithuania, experienced a revival as early as 1995, despite the fact
that its stabilization and reform process were proceeding slowly. Belarus' growth
strategy since the mid-1990s has focused on stimulating growth in priority sectors
through soft credits, subsidy schemes and administrative controls. While this strategy
stimulated economic activity in the short run, it very quickly resulted in high rates
of inflation and stifled private sector development. It also helped to perpetuate the
old industrial structure that would not have been competitive under normal market
conditions, and thus postponed the realization of Belarus' long-term growth
potential.
No studies have been published on why Belarus' output decline
was small, but the main explanation for its growth performance could be its
economy's close trade ties with Russia (Table 6). Through the transitional period
Belarus continued to export consumer goods to Russia that helped to preserve its
industrial production. However, since the Russian crisis in August 1998, Belarus'
economy had suffered a severe shock with output falling in 1999 and inflation rising
to nearly 350 percent (12-month rate) in July 1999. Real GDP grew by 3.4 percent
compared to 8.4 percent in 1998 and 11.4 percent in 1997. A combination of
domestic and external factors affected output growth in 1999. Externally, exports to
Russia, which accounted for more than 50 percent of the total exports, fell sharply
during the second half of 1998, in the wake or the Russian crisis. Demand for
Belarussian products was weak throughout 1999, showing the recovery only during
the final quarter, parallel with the revival of the economic activity in Russia. A
slowdown of domestic demand and the 1998/1999 payments crisis in Russia led to
a decline in exports and imports of 17 and 23 percent, respectively (year-on-year in
dollar terms). As a result, the current account deficit fell by more then two-thirds,
reaching 2.2 percent of GDP. Domestically, positive growth was maintained by a
continuation of government-directed programs to boost consumption and by an
expansionary monetary policy.
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Following Russia's recovery, economic growth increased to 5.8
percent in 2000. Belarus' economic miracle became possible thanks to financial help
from the Russia, which has written off 1 billion rubles of debts for energy carriers,
issues etc. Since then, however, economic activity has weakened, as suggested by a
rising level of inventories, non-cash transactions and domestic arrears, and a low
level of profits and investments (IMF, 2002). This has affected mainly industrial
production - the mainstay of the economic performance. Belarus has attempted to
insulate itself by pursuing a protective and active industrial policy. It has also been
investing in housing projects to help stimulate domestic demand and generate
employment. Probably to help achieve this goal, it has also raised wages faster than
productivity grew (financed again mostly from the profits of enterprises), gradually
harming the country's competitive position in the foreign market (IMF, 2002).
Table 6
BELARUS' TRADING PARTNERS IN 1994 AND 2000
(PERCENT DISTRIBUTION)
Exports Imports
1994 2000 1994 2000
Industrial countries 17.6 11.2 20.0 18.1
Germany  6.2  3.2 10.4  7.0
Developing countries 82.4 88.5 80.0 81.3
Europe 72.9 79.8 79.2 77.7
Russia 46.1 50.7 61.1 65.4
Africa  0.9  1.8  0.0  0.3
Asia  5.1  4.4  0.5  2.0
Middle East 1.0  1.1  0.0  0.2
Western Hemisphere  2.5  1.4  0.2  1.1
Other countries  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.5
Source: IMF Trade Direction 2001.
The inefficiency of the chosen model of growth became obvious
already in 2000, when the growth of quantitative indicators was accompanied by a
deterioration of qualitative indicators - profitability and solvency have fallen,
enterprises' debts as well as the number of unprofitable enterprises have risen. Belarus
became an outsider in pursuing market reforms, having the worst parameters of
market transformation, and therefore taking only the 148th place in the Heritage
Foundation rating of economic freedom.
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A declared economic growth goal has not been justified yet. A
repressive macroeconomic policy and non-transparent legal environment have
caused a capital outflow from the country, a mass departure of businesses "into the
shadow" as well as absence of private investments and savings. Although a positive
output growth was recorded - in some years at impressively high rates - Russia largely
drove this growth of demand for low-priced Belarussian industrial goods, so it was
not a result of economic restructuring.
f. Foreign Direct Investment
 as a Factor of Economic Growth
An important aspect to consider in the analysis is the link
between foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth, and the effect that
trade policies have on FDI. FDI influences a country's growth directly as a
component of total investment, which is one of the components of gross domestic
product. Most empirical studies reach a consensus that FDIs do lead to higher
economic growth. An open trade policy leads to more FDIs and exports, a
conclusion that makes many researchers claim that FDI and exports are
complements. In other words, trade and FDI increase or decrease together.
Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) emphasize the importance of liberal trade policies as a
positive growth factor. These policies create channels through which the output is
affected - by allowing foreign demand to spur recovery, creating incentives for
inward FDI, exposing foreign producers to competition, and helping realign
domestic prices with international prices. Trade openness has perhaps the clearest
effect on FDI through its influence on the determinants of FDI - the economy's size
in terms of GDP, the economy's stability which is reflected in the rate of inflation
and exchange rate volatility, production costs, wages and skill levels, the distance
from potential markets (transport costs) and industry profit rates.
Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) state that there is little disagreement in
the growth literature that investment is a major engine of growth in the medium to
long term, but also warn that new investment may be not be as important in the
initial recovery phase as it is when the recovery is merely extended. A pair of effects
that FDI has on economic growth has so far been identified as follows: direct effects,
also known as technology transfer, and indirect effects or spillover. Spillover,
whereby foreign investment enterprise unintentionally brings benefits to the host
economy through the leakage of skills, knowledge or technology into the local firms,
seems to draw a lot of attention. It is mostly due to the belief that spillover embodies
the true value of FDI for the host country - because it raises the level of
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competitiveness of local firms, often enabling them to start competing in the
international market.
A precondition for spillover to occur is a minimum threshold
of human capital, i.e. an absorption capacity of the advanced technology must exist
(Borensztein, De Georgio, Lee, 1998). Both Belarus and Lithuania satisfy this term,
but explaining the development of FDI inflows and their effects on these economies
is somewhat paradoxical. Lithuania seems to have attracted more FDI then Belarus.
That is not surprising considering Lithuania's international orientation, its stable
macroeconomic and political environment. As a matter of fact, all of the EU
accession candidates have been the primary target of the EU members' investment
outflows. The development of FDI inflows was by and large influenced by the
Lithuanian privatization methods - the initial phase of privatization (1991-1994)
offered scant possibilities for foreign capital to participate in the investment process.
However, USD 2.429 million stock of FDI does not guarantee that spillover actually
did occur in Lithuania, and no data was available to us to support the occurrence
of spillover.
Although almost equally distant to the EU as Lithuania, Belarus
failed to attract FDI. Both countries are also close to one of the most attractive
eastern markets in terms of its size and natural resources, Russia. In fact, Belarus' ties
with Russia are even tighter when the customs union with Russia, Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan is taken into account. Such a link to the large
markets of Russia would certainly be interesting for many foreign investors falling
into the category of market-seeking investors. Efficiency-seeking investors might find
the Belarussian educated but cheap labor force a suitable match for their
requirements. Nevertheless, Belarus has so far attracted a small amount of
investment, USD 1.240 million in total. FDI per capita provides us with a more
reliable picture of FDI relevance relative to the country's size. Lithuania, with its
USD 646 in FDI per capita in 1989-2000, is one of the most successful transition
economies in this respect. The Lithuanian case supports the empirical finding that
countries that have more open FDI policies do receive more FDIs. Taking 10.1
million of Belarussians into account, places the country with its USD 123 in FDI per
capita in 1989-2000 at the bottom of the transition economies' ranking. Belarus'
failure to attract FDI is even more evident when compared with the country of
similar size - the Czech Republic, with its 10.3 million inhabitants, managed to
attract USD 1.447 FDI per capita in 1989-1999.
Impressive rates of economic growth have also not helped
brighten Belarus' grim prospects of developing its macroeconomic conditions or
private sector, spurring privatization and improving government policies consistency
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- the elements which have proved to be perceived as too risky for foreign investors.
Little progress that was made in small-and-large scale privatization, along with a lack
of foreign investment promotion policies could be the main reasons for insufficient
FDI inflows into Belarus. High rates of inflation and, until recently, exchange rate
inconvertibility pointed to an unfavorable macroeconomic environment, which
hinders business planning. Murtha (1991) argues that the more disruptive or
inconsistent a government's policy is, the less likely a firm is to be involved with that
country or its suppliers (USITC, 1997). Uncertainties also arise from doubts about
further sustainable economic performance of Belarussian industries, since their
competitiveness is undermined by the restrictive trade and investment regime, and






Source: EBRD Transition report 2001.
When the possibility of spillover and the investment multiplier
are accounted for, one would expect that Lithuania's growth would be higher than
that of Belarus. With these facts in mind, it is somewhat paradoxical that, with its
decade-long trade policy interventionism and inconsistency in pursuing reforms in
the economic system, Belarus is reaping higher growth rates than Lithuania. This
controversy is directing us to the conclusion that FDI cannot serve as a sole
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Lithuania has liberalized its trade regime almost completely,
except for products controlled for health and safety reasons, environmental
protection etc. The country has a low average tariff rate with relatively little
dispersion with the exception of agriculture, which is the most protected sector
because of social and political repercussions that its liberalization might have.
Although the course of Lithuania's liberal trade policy seems to
be headed in the right direction, the currency board arrangement presents a real
obstacle to the multiplication of trade liberalization effects because it is hurting the
country's external price competitiveness. The expected switch from the litas peg to
the euro from the U.S. dollar will have a different impact on various industries,
depending on their export destinations. Nevertheless, this change appears to be
cost-worthy considering that the European Union is Lithuania's major trading
partner in the segment of most competitive industries such as fertilizers, wood,
furniture and textiles. Furthermore, the economic developments of the country
depend on those in the EU. Lastly, such a change could help improve the balance
of payments.
Lithuania has diverted its trade flows from Russia to the EU
significantly since early 1990s, but a reassessment of the trade tie with Russia is called
for. Lithuania imports from Russia constitute 27.4 percent of its total imports,
consisting mostly of raw materials. It is evident that Lithuania would benefit from
a bilateral liberalization of trade. What makes the realization of the proposal
impossible is its political flavor that contradicts the determination to move towards
the EU accession. Taking into account these factors, supplementary benefits from
a deeper cooperation with Russia may be reached with Russia's accession to WTO
and its multilateral trade regime liberalization. However, Lithuania's diversification
of trade flows towards new, more developed markets and its switch to new industries
of a higher level of specialization indicate that restructuring has taken place.
The future Lithuanian trade policy is strongly dependent on the
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country's expectation to join the EU in 2004, when it will have to implement the
European Union's Common Commercial Policy, as well as the system of preferential
trade agreements with the third countries. There is still some room for improvement
in the Lithuanian institutional setting. A sound institutional design requires
decision-making process to be isolated from narrow interest groups. Enterprises that
have not yet faced strong competition have rarely used protection to accelerate
restructuring but have instead earned excess profits. The biggest concern is that
priorities are favoring protectionist actions more than the overall liberalization,
which would work more for the benefit of consumers and user-industries. It would
be beneficial for Lithuania to reform its institutional setting by reducing the
influence of narrow interest groups and combining trade policy decisions with
competition policies.
Belarus
Although Belarus has been enjoying high rates of economic
growth, should their downturn trend continue, it will prove to be the first indicator
of the growth's unsustainability. Like Lithuania, Belarus is a small economy, which,
by definition, is dependant on trade. Indeed, the Russian crisis of 1999 suppressed
trading activity between the two countries and thereby negatively impacted the
Belarussian growth. Still, the growth rate of that year was positive, which is difficult
to explain when Belarussian exposure to and dependence on the Russian economy
is considered. One of the possible explanations could be the absence of restructuring
of the economy which in turn prolonged the shock absorption over a longer period
whereas Lithuania's reformed economy, which is less dependant on the Russian
market, absorbed the shock promptly and had a negative rate of growth. Another
part of the explanation stems from the fact that the economic developments in
Belarus are deeply linked to Russia, which has provided it with large energy subsidies
(according to some estimates they amount to 10 percent of GDP), free border access
to its markets together with generous provisions for barter trading. Therefore, it is
possible that the downward trend in Belarussian growth rates over the last few years
is actually effectuating the 1999 crisis, compounded by new external and internal
circumstances. Nevertheless, the rates of growth remain positive thanks to the initial
economic "jerk" even though the growth might have fallen.
So far, liberalization of the trade regime has been slow and
government interference in the external trade strong. This interference was most
visible in the support and subsidies to exporters as well as in setting export prices.
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All of these government interventions make any progress toward entering the WTO
and integration with the world trade system impossible.
Tightening of the economic and political ties with Russia was
further strengthened with Belarus' participation in the customs union, although its
trade with other members apart from Russia is quite insignificant. Since the outset
of transition, the share of imports from and exports to Russia in the total imports
and exports has been increasing. Belarus' participation in the customs union is vital
for the country's industries whose production depends on raw materials from Russia.
Another potential benefit of the membership in the customs union could be its
increased negotiating power in WTO rounds. The existing customs union has a
certain potential to lead to enforcing the targeted trade regulation changes by
making them part of the union's legislation. Another step in that direction would
be the removal of non-market barriers (safety standards, labeling, and other barriers),
as set out in the WTO agreements. Havrylyshyn at al. (1999) argue that high taxes
or import controls are highly likely to reduce the growth potential of any country.
Nevertheless, a reorientation to the developed markets of the
European Union and the CEEC markets may prove desirable because they would
decrease the country's dependence on the Russian demand. In order to achieve the
reorientation, there should be a qualitative enhancement of Belarussian exports.
Financial instruments and insurance would need to be available to a greater extent
to facilitate trade. To support these efforts, the government would have to cease to
support the 'selected' industries and ease the burden of overly high taxes on the new
profitable sector.
The private sector share in the economy is still the lowest among
transition economies because of the state dominance in economic affairs. Not only
is a shift to private market economy needed, but a more favorable business climate
should also be created. Macroeconomic conditions improved considerably in 2000
with a unification of the exchange rates, and a liberalization of the exchange system.
A deregulation and price liberalization were only initiated. Reducing inflation is
among top priorities, requiring tight monetary and fiscal policies as well as setting
a ceiling on wages. Financial discipline must be enforced in the form of hard budget
constraints on public entities. This is confirmed by Havryshylyn et al. (1999):
"Growth will not occur until new incentives are in place and made credible; that is, the sooner
reforms achieve a hard budget constraint and liberal price environment, the sooner reallocation
and the restructuring of the old and the creation of new production will begin".
However, we remain convinced that most difficulties in Belarus'
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trade system stem from the overall macroeconomic instability in the country. The
trade reform, along with price and enterprise reforms, are among the changes that
are critical to macroeconomic stabilization. A privatization of enterprises is also
important for export performance and for the trade reform success. Unless it is
carried out properly, enterprises will not respond efficiently to the new challenges
and FDI levels will remain unchanged. Moreover, lack of innovation, as the main
characteristic of state-owned enterprises, will make it difficult for them to compete
in the sectors where quality improvements are important or to improve export
performance.
Currency convertibility should be one of the primary political
targets of the country, at least for the benefit of current account transactions. A key
requirement is the establishment of a foreign exchange market with unrestricted
access. Some positive moves in that direction have already been made. In 2000, a
dual exchange rate system was abolished and a new program of supporting small and
medium size business was launched in 2001. Also, the state economic entity
registration was completed in 2001. Bearing these small positive changes in mind,
we finish our paper by concluding that a number of policy changes remains to be
enforced in order to support the country's objective of a longer-term market
adjustment and integration into the world economy. Belarus has been an interesting
case because it gives a picture of an economy that has undertaken pursuing reforms
at an unconventionally slow pace while the rest of the transition world has been
competing for positions in the international markets. Belarus will certainly benefit
from its late-starter-of-reforms position because it will enable it to take economic
decisions bearing in mind the experiences of other transition economies, but at the
same time it will find it difficult to catch-up with other transition economies and
compensate for the missed opportunities.
PRIVREDNA KRETANJA I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 95broj 90/2002.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ben-David, D., 1993, "Equalizing exchange: Trade liberalization
and Income Convergence", Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 108, No. 3,
653-680.
Berg, A., E. Borensztein, R. Sahay and J. Zettelmeyer, 1999, "The
Evolution of Output in Transition Economies: Explaining the Differences", IMF
Working paper No. 99/73, International Monetary Fund, (May).
Borensztein, E., J. De Gregorio, and J-W. Lee, 1998, "How does
foreign direct investment affect economic growth?", Journal of International
Economics Vol. 45, No. 1, (June), 115-135.
Dollar D., and A. Kraay, 2001, "Trade, Growth, and Poverty",
Research Paper No. 2615, The World Bank.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001,
Transition Report 2001: Energy in Transition, EBRD: London.
Edwards, S., 1993, "Openness, Trade Liberalization, and Growth
in Developing Countries", Journal of Economic Literature, XXXI (3), (September),
1358-1393.
Frankel, J. A. and D. Romer, 1999, "Does trade cause growth?",
The American Economic Review Vol. 89, No. 3, (June), 379-399.
Havrylyshyn, O. et al., 1999, "Growth Experience in transition
countries", 1990-98, Occasional Paper No. 184, International Monetary Fund.
Harrison, A., 1996, "Openness and growth: A time-series,
cross-country analysis for developing countries", Journal of Development Economics,
Vol. 48, 419-447.
Kaminski, B., 2001, "How Accession to the European Union Has
Affected External Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Central European
Economies", Research Paper No. 2578, The World Bank.
"Lithuania: The Transition to a Market Economy", 1993, World
Bank Country Study, Report No. 11754, (March).
"Memorandum of the President of The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and of the International Finance Corporation to
the Executive Directors on a country assistance strategy for Belarus", Report No.
23401, The World Bank, (February).
Mervar, Andrea, 1996, "Economic growth in Croatia: Conditions,
Determinants and Prospects", The Florida State University, College of Social
Sciences, Master's Thesis.
96 PRIVREDNA KRETANJA I EKONOMSKA POLITIKAbroj 90/2002.
Michalopoulos C. and D. Tarr, 1997, "The Economics of
Customs Unions in the Commonwealth of Independent States", Working Paper No.
1786, The World Bank.
Michalopoulos, Constantine, 1999, "The integration of transition
economies into the world trading system", Working Paper No. 2182, The World
Bank.
Michalopoulos, Constantine, 1998, "WTO accession for countries
in transition", Working Paper No. 1934, The World Bank.
Olson, Mancur, Jr., 1996, "Distinguished lecture on Economics
in Government: Big bills left on the sidewalk - Why some nations are rich, and
others poor", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10 (Spring), 3-24.
"Republic of Belarus: Selected issues", 2002, IMF Country Report
No. 02/22, International Monetary Fund, (February).
"Republic of Belarus - Staff Monitored Program - Letter of Intent,
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum
of Understanding", 2001, International Monetary Fund, (April).
Rakova, E., 2002, "Otlojennye reformy - upuschennye
vozmojnosti",Nacionalnaya economicheskaya gazeta, No. 30, 1-5
Romer, Paul M., 1990, "Endogenous Technological Change",
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (October), S71-S102.
"A Regional Economic Assessment of the Baltic States, 2000:
Insights from a decade of transition", 2000, Policy brief, OECD, (February).
Rodríguez, F. and D. Rodrik, 2001, "Trade policy and economic
growth: A skeptic's guide to the cross - national evidence",Macroeconomics Annual
2000, (eds.) Bernanke B. and K. S. Rogoff, MIT Press for NBER: Cambridge, MA,
(forthcoming).
Sachs, J. and A. Warner, 1995, "Economic Reform and the
Process of Global Integration", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1-118.
"The Dynamic Effects of Trade Liberalization: An Empirical
Analysis", 1997, US International Trade Commission: Washington, DC, (October).
Vamvakidis, A., 1998, Regional Integration and Economic
Growth, The World Bank Economic Review Vol. 12, No. 2, (May), 251-270.
World Economic Outlook, 2000, "Focus on transition
economies", International Monetary Fund, (October).
Web sites: The World Bank (www.worldbank.org), International
Monetary Fund (www.imf.org), and World Trade Organization (www.wto.org).
WTO Annual Report 1997, World Trade Organization: Geneva,
(December).


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































98 PRIVREDNA KRETANJA I EKONOMSKA POLITIKAbroj 90/2002.
ANNEX 2
 












1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Belarus Lithuania
PRIVREDNA KRETANJA I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 99broj 90/2002.
ANNEX 3












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PRIVREDNA KRETANJA I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 101broj 90/2002.
ANNEX 4
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PRIVREDNA KRETANJA I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 103broj 90/2002.
Trgovinska politika i gospodarski rast:
sluèajevi Bjelorusije i Litve
Sažetak Namjera je grupe autora ovog rada istražiti teorijsku i empirijsku
literaturu o postojanju veze izmeðu trgovinskih politika i
gospodarskog rasta. U svrhu analize uèinaka trgovinskih politika
na gospodarski rast, odabran je par tranzicijskih gospodarstva -
Bjelorusija i Litva. Iako su obje zemlje male, trgovinske im se
politike razlikuju. Dok Litva uživa slobodnu trgovinsku politiku,
bjeloruska trgovinska politika okarakterizirana je snažnim
državnim upletanjem. Stope gospodarskog rasta obaju zemalja
uglavnom su bile pozitivne, s tim da su se bjeloruske pokazale
veæe od litvanskih. Meðutim, politike koje su poluèile visoke
bjeloruske stope gospodarskog rasta, kao i uvjeti u kojima su
nastale, ne èine se stabilnima. Stoga je izgledno da æe se, uslijed
moguæe promjene vanjskih uvjeta, bjeloruske dojmljive stope
rasta u buduænosti pokazati neodrživima.
